The largest political party in independent Sri Lanka, the United National  Party (UNP), emerged as an umbrella party from the colonial era. It was similar  in some respects to the Indian 
National Congress. Like its Indian  counterpart, the UNP represented a union of a number of groups espousing  different personalities and ideologies. Known later as the "uncle-nephew  
party" because of the kinship ties among the party's top leadership, the UNP  served as the standard-bearer of conservative forces. In late 1947, when the  party won the country's first 
general election, the UNP attempted to  establish an anticommunist, intercommunal parliamentary form of government.  Prominent nationalists, such as D.S. Senanayake and S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike  (the country's first and fourth prime ministers, respectively), led the UNP. The  party's internal differences gradually worsened, however. The first and most  serious break 
came in July 1951, when Bandaranaike's left-of-center bloc  seceded to form the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the first major non-Marxist  political movement to oppose the UNP.  
Despite the benevolent guidance of Senanayake, the UNP could not defuse the  nascent dissension between the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Some of Senanayake's  policies, particularly his 
awarding of land grants to Sinhalese settlers for  the resettlement of the northern dry zone, precipitated renewed competition  between the two ethnic groups.  
When Senanayake died in a horseback-riding accident in March 1952, not only  the UNP, but also the entire nation suffered from the loss of the only man who  could pose as a credible 
symbol for the country's unity. In the election  that was held immediately after Senanayake's death, the UNP, led by his son  Dudley, and the SLFP, led by Bandaranaike, vied for Sinhalese 
votes, while  the Tamil Congress and Federal Party competed for the Tamil vote. The UNP won  the election, and the SLFP emerged as major opposition party. The SLFP managed  to win 
only nine out of forty-eight seats in Parliament. The Tamil Congress,  having supported the UNP, lost much of its following to the Federal Party, which  continued to advocate an 
autonomous homeland within a Sri Lankan federation.  Ethnic tensions, although mounting, remained manageable.  
After D. S. Senanayake's death, the nation's economic problems became  apparent. The terms of world trade were turning against Sri Lanka. The  population was growing faster than 
production in most sectors. A World Bank  (see Glossary) study completed in 1952 noted that social and welfare services  were consuming 35 percent of the budget. The report 
recommended that the  government rice subsidy--which accounted for the major portion of the  expenditure--be reduced. Prime Minister Senanayake followed the advice, but the  move 
proved to be his political undoing. A massive, sometimes violent civil  disobedience movement was launched to protest the reduction of the rice subsidy  and provoked the resignation of 
Senanayake. In October 1953, his cousin, Sir  John Kotelawala, became prime minister and remained in office until the UNP  defeat in the 1956 election.  
The UNP government under Kotelawala disagreed with India's interpretation of  political solidarity in the developing world. This divergence became painfully  clear to India at the Colombo 
Conference of 1954 and the Bandung Conference  in Indonesia in 1955. Kotelawala's strident condemnation of communism, as well  as the more fashionable condemnation of Western 
imperialism, especially  irritated India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Kotelawala was also anxious  to have Ceylon join the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but he  
encountered strong domestic opposition to the plan. The Soviet Union was  especially sensitive to what it considered the government's pro-Western attitude  and repeatedly vetoed Sri 
Lanka's application to join the United Nations  (UN). Sri Lanka was finally admitted in 1955 as part of an East-West agreement.  
The UNP continued a defense agreement with the British that spared Sri Lanka  the cost of maintaining a large military establishment. National defense  consumed less than 4 percent of 
the government budget in the  postindependence years, and hence the military was not in a position to  interfere with politics.
 
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